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Abstract 
We model 73.62 million London Stock Exchange (LSE) trades and show that the LSE’s high 
rate of failure to open at the opening auction only relates to low volume stocks. Low volume 
stock traders avoid trading until the open; this seems connected to their evading the informed 
trading-dominated opening auction. For the largest volume stocks, the opening auction 
provides highly efficient opening prices, while the lower volume stocks attain similar levels 
of price efficiency only after the start of normal trading hours (NTH). At the close however, 
all stocks only lose small fractions of informational efficiency achieved during the NTH.     
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 1. Introduction 
The question of how financial instruments’ prices develop on financial platforms has 
fascinated both academic researchers and practitioners for decades. The introduction of 
computer-aided trading, and relatively more recently, algorithmic trading, has only increased 
this interest. The process of generating a fair price for an instrument can be quite complicated 
given possible information asymmetry. However, decades of relentless technological 
advancement has led to the development of ultra-quick information dissemination processes, 
which now feed directly into platform trades. The proliferation of information dissemination 
structures, such as bespoke real-time trading information providers and 24-hour financial 
markets news channels such as CNBC and Bloomberg, has now led to an unprecedented 
timely release of information to the market place. These streams of data feed directly into 
algorithmic trading strategies, which have been shown to improve trading quality by 
narrowing spreads, reducing adverse selection and enhancing the informativeness of quotes 
(see Hendershott et al., 2011). Even with these advancements, establishing an opening 
reference price after a market closure can still be a challenging process. Market closure may 
be due to the close of regular trading, trading suspensions or temporary halts. For traders, 
establishing a fair price after such closures is critical to trading strategy. The importance of 
the pre-open to price discovery is demonstrated by Biais et al. (1999) and Cao et al. (2000) 
who show evidence of ‘learning’ through the posting of non-binding quotes on the Paris 
Bourse and NASDAQ respectively. It is also important to note that opening prices may 
influence trader disposition throughout the trading day, and closing prices may be the basis 
for settling derivative contracts. 
Given the significance of the opening and closing prices to trading, we investigate 
whether the call auction, one of the most popular opening mechanisms in major markets, 
yields efficient opening prices. We employ data from the world’s oldest and fourth largest 
exchange by trading volume, the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The LSE is an interesting 
 market to study because it is a hybrid trading platform. On the platform there is direct 
competition for order flow between participants (mainly institutional investors) in the broker-
dealer market and others who directly submit orders to the limit order book. This is an 
interesting mix that naturally should enhance market quality. However, results obtained 
suggest that the opening call auction is only informative for the highest volume stocks, while 
for the low volume stocks, price discovery only really starts after the market opens as there is 
a high rate of failure to open at the call for small volume stocks. Furthermore, the dealer-
broker trades entered during the pre-open, prior to the call auction, reveal very little 
information. The price discovery during this period is not significantly different from zero. 
Given the noise levels in the dealer-broker trades, only the highest volume stocks that 
succeed at the call are able to post significantly high levels of informational price efficiency 
during the LSE pre-open. For all stocks however, there is a high level of price efficiency 
during the normal trading hours (NTH), which only declines slightly after the NTH. We also 
find that small volume stock traders are likely to avoid trading during the opening call 
auction, due to the high level of information asymmetry/informed trading occurring during 
this period. Thus, the decision to avoid the opening call may be due to the need to avoid 
trading in an environment dominated by informed traders. 
One may argue that the significance of the opening price has been reduced by the rise 
of Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) and Broker Crossing Networks (BCNs), 
which make after hours trading possible, albeit with higher levels of informed trading and 
lower trading volumes (see for example Barclay and Hendershott, 2003). The price discovery 
process during the after hours trading period is also fraught with inefficiencies relative to the 
normal trading hours (NTH) session. The prices are more volatile, the adverse selection costs 
are higher, and thus spreads are generally wider. Barclay and Hendershott (2003) therefore 
find that price efficiency after hours is less than during the NTH because very little new 
 information is released while trading is also thin. This means that even if post-NTH trading 
does provide some foundation for opening prices, most market participants are unlikely to 
trade on that basis because of the noise levels during the price discovery process once the 
market has officially closed. This underscores the significance of the opening price and the 
process that generates it. Thus markets around the world have evolved their opening practices 
in order to facilitate the efficiency of the price discovery process. The most widely adopted 
pre-open mechanism by platforms is the one we study in this paper – the call auction.  
A stream of literature has examined the impact of the introduction of opening and 
closing call auctions on market quality. However, to our knowledge there is no linkage 
between informational efficiency and other market quality characteristics evolving in the 
opening auction, to the NTH market efficiency within an intraday modelling framework. The 
general approach has been to test whether the introduction or evolution of a trading 
system/mechanism positively or negatively influences market characteristics.  A number of 
these studies mainly adopt an event study framework employing daily data (opening and 
closing prices). Thus none of the contributions have actually examined these issues on an 
intraday basis using high frequency trading data.  Further, most of the focus has been on the 
introduction of closing auctions rather than opening auctions. For example, Chelley-Steeley 
(2008) and Chelley-Steeley (2009) investigate the market quality impact of the introduction 
of the closing auction on the LSE. Both studies document market quality improvements based 
on daily level data. The studies, however, do not isolate the direct market quality impacts of 
auction trades during the opening or closing call auction periods on continuous trading during 
the NTH. Pagano and Schwartz (2003) and Comerton-Forde et al. (2007) examine the 
introduction of the closing auction on the Paris Bourse and the Singapore Stock Exchange 
respectively; both papers suggest that the introduction of the call closing auction improves 
market quality. Comerton-Forde et al. (2007) also consider the impact of the closing auction 
 in tandem with the opening auction without decomposing the impacts since both were 
introduced during the same month, and their study also employs daily data in an event study 
context. Another study, which focuses on the Singapore Stock Exchange, by Chang et al. 
(2008) confirms the “spillover effect”, which was first documented by Pagano and Schwartz 
(2003) based on their analysis of trading on the Paris Bourse. 
Since previous literature streams support the notion that the introduction of call 
auction enhances market quality, the past decade has seen the introduction of call auctions for 
closing and, in many cases, also the opening of trading venues across the world. There is a 
strong theoretical argument for congregating all available market liquidity at a single point in 
order to determine the fair price of an instrument. Schwartz (2001) asserts that this enhances 
the accuracy of the price discovery process. The view that the efficiency of the price 
discovery process is inextricably linked with liquidity is widely supported in the literature 
and has been further established by Chordia et al. (2008), amongst others. According to 
Madhavan (1992), since all traders are given access to the same prices at the same time, call 
auctions reduce information asymmetry. However, this comes at the price of higher 
information (and thus transaction) costs over time, as auctions can only be periodic at best. 
Barclay et al. (2008) also show that the consolidation of orders, which occurs during a call 
auction, rather than the nearness of traders or the involvement of market makers, is the vital 
factor for price efficiency in a market opening. Furthermore, their results imply that call 
auctions are more likely to absorb extreme liquidity shock without yielding inefficient prices 
and volatility. Amihud et al. (1990) find on the Milan Stock Exchange that when a 
continuous trading period is preceded by a call auction, volatility associated with that 
continuous trading session is lower than if it had not been preceded by a call auction. The 
improvement in market quality, usually associated with reduced volatility, perhaps explains 
why Schnitzlein’s (1996) experimental study finds that under a call auction, despite no 
 significant reduction in average price efficiency, there is a reduction in adverse selection 
costs incurred by uninformed traders. Interestingly, however, empirical evidence presented 
by Ellul et al. (2005) suggests that call markets are less suited than the broker-dealer system 
to deal with adverse selection. They also find that on days when uncertainty is higher, there is 
increased migration from the call market to the broker-dealer during the LSE pre-open, 
suggesting that traders prefer the broker-dealer when information asymmetry is on the rise. 
They argue that small stocks/orders traders are more likely to trade using the broker-dealer 
market rather than the call, because they are more likely to find counterparties by using that 
option (coordination theory). Somewhat contradictorily, their results also indicate that small 
orders obtain lower transaction costs on the call market when compared to the broker-dealer.  
Thus one would expect small stocks/orders traders to prefer the call market at the open and 
close, and that this should drive the availability of counterparties in the auction system for 
small stocks. Despite a number of contributions addressing issues around the use of the call 
auction to open or close, only a few published papers have examined inter-temporal links 
between the opening auction and continuous trading sessions. Brooks and Moulton (2004) 
provide evidence on interactions between the opening auction on an exchange, the NYSE, 
and the continuous regular trading day, but only focus on trading activities such as volume. 
Volume in itself does not imply liquidity or market efficiency; Johnson (2008) shows that 
volume and liquidity are unrelated over time and Chordia et al. (2008) show that liquidity is 
linked to market efficiency.  
Our study is related to those of both Ellul et al. (2005) and Barclay et al. (2008). 
However, this paper is different from those two papers, since they focus on the 
contemporaneous comparison of two different trading mechanisms/options, whilst we focus 
on how the price discovery and other relevant trading parameters from one mechanism 
evolve as the market shifts to a different trading mechanism. Specifically, Ellul et al. (2005) 
 and Barclay et al. (2008) focus on traders’ selection of trading mechanism(s) and the 
market’s capacity to absorb order imbalances respectively.1 We are also motivated 
differently; our aim is to examine first the efficiency levels of the opening price, and then 
how that evolves as the continuous trading period commences; we also observe the price 
efficiency during and after the closing call auction. This examination should shed some light 
on whether the opening auction period contributes to the NTH in terms of efficient price 
discovery. This main focus is also partially influenced by the findings of Barclay and 
Hendershott (2008). In their paper, which compares trading and non-trading mechanisms of 
price discovery, they suggest that the pre-open trading on NASDAQ contributes to the 
efficiency of the opening price. We aim to find out whether this holds when the pre-open is 
structured such that the opening price is determined by a call auction, and the NTH is a 
continuous order-driven market. If informed traders do not employ the opening call auction, 
given high failure rates to open, as implied by Ellul et al. (2005)
2
, then the pre-open/opening 
auction price on the LSE may not provide a more informative or efficient opening price than 
say the first 10-20 minutes of the NTH. If, indeed, the opening auction/pre-open contributes 
to market quality during the NTH, then we expect the price efficiency for this period to be 
higher than, or equal to, other 10-minute periods across the NTH.  
 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1. Trading on the London Stock Exchange 
Until 20
th
 October 1997 when the LSE introduced an electronic order-matching system called 
the Stock Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS) for all FTSE 100 stocks, it had 
                                                          
1
 Our research questions may also be linked to Amihud et al. (1990). However, the Milan Stock Exchange call 
method on which their study is based is significantly different from the one we study. Further, there are 
significant differences in the methodological approach they employ and ours; this is further amplified by the 
thin trading observed on the Milan stock exchange at the time of their study.    
2
 Friederich and Payne (2007:1176)  even went as far as stating that: “The opening batch auctions in particular 
were never successful in London…”. 
 functioned as a pure dealer market.
3
 The FTSE 100 includes the largest firms by market value 
as listed on the LSE, and they account for about 81% of the total market capitalisation on the 
exchange. The introduction of SETS on the LSE encapsulates a shift from a strictly quote 
driven market to an order driven one. The SETS has since grown to become one of the most 
liquid electronic order books in the world. The LSE now operates as a hybrid market, with 
the dealer market and the SETS limit order book. Daily, continuous trading on the floor of the 
exchange is preceded by a 10-minute call auction at 07:50:00hrs London local time. 
However, generally during the pre-open (including prior to the opening auction), broker-
dealer trades can also be reported. During the pre-open, limit and market orders may be 
entered and deleted at will, and all order book data are communicated to the market. In 
advance of the batch auction at 08:00:00hrs, the order book is suspended. An uncrossing 
algorithm subsequently runs to facilitate the execution of orders at prices that maximise the 
volume of instruments traded. Once buy and sell orders are crossed, indicative uncrossing 
prices for each instrument are displayed as the opening prices for the NTH.
4
 The continuous 
trading period (NTH) is normally the longest period of the day and it concludes at 16:30:00 
hrs. Thereafter, the closing call auction commences for five minutes starting at 16:30:01hrs. 
During the closing auction, limit and market orders can be submitted. If buy and sell orders 
are crossed during this period, the uncrossing price is released to the market as the closing 
price, as well as the indicative price at which crossed orders are executed. If there are 
remaining unexecuted orders following the uncrossing, an MOE is activated. And if the 
uncrossing price is at least 5% away from the VWAP (if there is no VWAP, then the last 
                                                          
3
 Subsequently, in September 1999, the most liquid FTSE 250 stocks were also migrated to SETS. 
4
 Extensions to the opening auction can be activated under two scenarios. First, a Market Order Extension 
(MOE) could be activated for two minutes plus random 30-second end periods where there are unexecuted 
market orders on the order book after the uncrossing. Secondly, a Price Monitoring Extension (PME) can be 
activated where the indicative uncrossing price is at least 20% at variance with the final continuous session trade 
of the previous day. The MOE and PME can each only occur once for a trading session, thus all unexecuted 
orders after this point are retained on the order book for possible execution during the continuous trading phase. 
If the order book is not crossed for any instrument, the first automatic trade during the continuous trading 
session will be its opening price for trading on that day. 
 automatic trade), a PME is activated. Should the uncrossing price remain at least 5% away 
from the VWAP (or the last automatic trade) an Additional PME (APME) will be activated. 
The APME runs for 10 minutes plus a random 30-second end period. All these extensions can 
occur only once per closing of a trading day. If the closing procedure does not yield an 
indicative uncrossing price, then the last automatic trade during the trading day will be the 
closing price.
5
 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample Selection 
We obtain ultra-high frequency data for SETS segments SETS0 and SETS1, which contain 
the most liquid FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms, from the Thomson Reuters Tick History 
(TRTH) database. The dataset covers 253 LSE trading days between 1
st
 October 2012 and 
30
th
 September 2013, and contains approximately 1.65 billion observations (including quotes 
and transactions data); all observations are time stamped to the nearest millisecond. The 
following variables are included in the datasets: Reuters Identification Code (RIC), date, 
timestamp, price, volume, bid price, ask price, bid volume and ask volume.  
In the dataset, quotes account for a little over 1.498 billion (90.79%) of the 
observations.  This means that quotes are updated regularly relative to trading or order 
submission frequency, and thus we can easily obtain the best prevailing bid and ask quotes 
for each trade. We first employ the quotes in determining the prevailing best bid and ask 
quotes, as well as quote midpoints for each transaction; thereafter the quote rows are 
eliminated from the dataset, thus leaving us with only the trades, totalling 150,660,824. We 
identify a number of anomalies in the 150,660,824 trade observations that could only have 
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 See London Stock Exchange (2000a, 2000b, 2001 and 2013) for more details of the institutional framework. 
 been as a result of data input errors. In order to remove these input errors and to eliminate 
extreme price values, we delete all observations satisfying any of the following criteria: 
 
1. Transaction price during the NTH is greater than the prevailing best ask price; 
2. The quoted bid price exceeds the quoted ask price; 
3. Quoted bid-ask spread, defined as the difference between the ask and the bid price, 
exceeds £4; 
4. Quoted bid-ask spread divided by the transaction price is greater than 0.35;6 
5. Any of the following variables is missing for that observation: price, volume, quoted 
bid and ask prices; 
6. Non-FTSE 100 stock transaction; 
7. Transaction is for FTSE 100 stock added to or removed from the index between the 
period 30
th
 September 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013.  
 
We also eliminate all trades reported after 16:50:00hrs from the final sample because they are 
reported after the time a possible APME could have run each day. These conditions yield a 
final combined dataset with 73,616,187 transactions for 70 FTSE 100 stocks trading over the 
sample period. The 70 stocks account for 91.23% of the total FTSE 100 market capitalisation 
on 30
th
 September 2013, the last date in our sample. To the best of our knowledge, the 
number of transactions used in this paper is larger than those used in any prior study of the 
microstructure of the LSE.  
 
3.2. Sample Description 
                                                          
6
 Conditions 3 and 4 are inspired by Chordia et al. (2001); given the improved levels of trading frequency, the 
conditions stipulated in the earlier paper are adjusted for higher trading frequency. 
 The combined FTSE 100 stocks in the sample average a total trading value of over £21.54 
billion per day from a daily average of 290,973 transactions. The total traded value over the 
253 trading day-period is about £5.45 ($8.96) trillion. Table 1 shows the daily trading activity 
statistics for the sample used in this paper. Panels A and B present summaries for the 
exchange floor and the dealer market respectively, while Panel C shows daily averages of the 
transactions for both venues. In all panels, we rank the sample stocks into quintiles on the 
basis of transaction volumes for the sample period. Quintile 5 contains the 14 highest trading 
stocks by daily pound value, and Quintile 1 contains the 14 lowest trading stocks by daily 
pound value.
7
 The panels are divided into three main time periods for each quintile: Pre-open 
(07:10:00hrs - call end), NTH (08:00:30hrs - 16:30:00hrs) and Post-NTH (16:30:01hrs - 
16:50:00hrs). Pre-open is also further divided into Pre-opening call auction (07:10:00hrs - 
07:50:00hrs) and the Opening auction (07:50:01hrs - call end). Post-NTH includes the 
Closing auction (16:30:01hrs - 16:38:00hrs) and the Post-close (16:38:01hrs -16:50:00hrs). 
The highest grossing stocks have the highest number of transactions and pound value 
per day. The combined daily number of transactions (pound value) for the highest trading 
stocks is about six (207.33) times greater than the total for the lowest trading stocks; most of 
these are executed directly on the exchange floor. Also, most of the daily transactions occur 
during the NTH; almost 98% (284,548) of all transactions are recorded for the NTH. 
However, the trend is very different when one considers the value of those transactions; on an 
average day, the NTH accounts for only about 13.89% (£2.99 billion) of total traded value, 
while the post-NTH accounts for 84.86% (£18.28 billion). This is quite an interesting yet 
consistent occurrence for nearly every day in the sample. A closer look shows that the 
unusual phenomenon occurs only for the highest trading stocks grouped into Quintile 5; for 
                                                          
7
 The use of the transaction pound volume as a basis for segmenting stocks is driven by it being the most 
economically significant measure of trading activity, given that some orders may not result in a transaction but 
could be employed for quote stuffing or spoofing. Further the currency volume is a generally accepted basis for 
grouping stocks in price discovery-related studies in market microstructure (see as examples, Barclay and 
Hendershott, 2003; Bessembinder and Venkataraman, 2004). 
 the other four quintiles, the NTH easily accounts for 73.81% (£1.27 billion) of daily average 
traded value, while post-NTH only accounts for 23.04% (£395.48 million) of the daily 
average of traded value. Further, we find that the trades responsible for the massive values 
traded during the post-NTH period usually occur post-close and are off-floor dealer trades 
reported on the LSE. Since the large Quintile 5 post-NTH trades are off-floor broker-dealer 
trades, they are upstairs VWAP – volume weighted average price trades registered on SETS 
after the close (during and after closing auction). Institutional Investors are allowed to submit 
VWAP orders to the LSE dealer market, which can be executed at the close. VWAP orders 
do not include price, only the quantity to buy or sell, since the price is based on the weighted 
average price generated by the day’s trading volume. They are usually very large trades, as 
demonstrated in the average size values presented in Panel C of Table 2. For example, the 
average post-closing auction size for the institutional dealer trades in the highest volume 
stocks is about 15 times as large as the corresponding trades on the exchange floor. The 
impact of these presumably pre-priced trades should be of interest; hence we extend the 
trading time of interest in our sample to 16:50:00hrs in order to capture their after hours 
effects. Their impact can, however, be isolated since our analytical approach is mainly based 
on estimating values within time-specific intervals.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
While the post-NTH period is a relatively active interval of the day for all the quintiles, with 
even the first quintile averaging nearly 600 transactions per day in both venues, the pre-open 
is only significantly active for the highest volume quintile. However, pre-open trades are 
usually larger on average than trades during any other phase of the trading day, and this is 
confirmed in Panel C of Table 1. The average size for trades occurring in the pre-opening 
auction period is higher than other periods for four of the five quintiles, the only exception 
 being the largest volume quintile where the post-NTH VWAP trades and the flurry of high 
volume closing auction orders tilt the balance. Given the propensity of large trades to elicit 
microstructure impacts, and because the period, with the exception of the largest volume 
stocks, is characterised by thin trading, we expect the two pre-open intervals to be noisier for 
lower volume stocks than the other periods of the day. Literature suggests that trading 
activity enhances price discovery, thus when trading is thin, the price discovery process is 
less efficient, although we also note that quotes are frequently posted and updated by market 
makers during the 10-minute auction period and prior to the auction period proper. Thus the 
level of market support available during the period prior to the NTH is not significantly less 
than during the NTH, and this may help to improve the price discovery process prior to the 
NTH. The question of whether posting of quotes can help improve price discovery is also 
dependent on the quote spreads. If the market makers are cautious, the posting and updating 
of quotes may not do much to help since the spreads will be wide in order to reflect adverse 
selection costs. We consider this issue in subsequent sections.         
 
3.3. Trading Activity on the LSE 
Figure 1 shows the daily volume per minute for the five quintiles; the logs of the values are 
plotted given the high variability in volume differences among the three trading periods. 
During the pre-open and prior to the call auction period, some trading is registered. However, 
as shown earlier in Table 1, these trades are few and are all executed in the dealer market, 
leading to a slow start to the pre-open. The average daily number of trades in the pre-opening 
call auction ranges from 7.37 to 23.45, from the lowest volume stocks to the highest. All 
stocks generally show high levels of variation in average trading values per minute prior to 
the opening call auction. For example, in the first minute of the pre-open included in the 
sample (07:16:00hrs), the average trading volume for all quintiles is about £33.65 million, 
 this falls some 99.86% to approximately £48,714 at 07:50:00hrs, just milliseconds before the 
call auction period. The average daily trading volume then rises sharply to more than £173.33 
million for the entire call auction from 07:50:00 - 08:00:00hrs. The final 50-odd seconds of 
the opening call auction itself accounts for approximately 58.41% of the call auction period 
trading value, as most of the orders are entered just before the auction algorithm runs. This 
volatile trend in early trading activity is well-documented in literature. For example, Barclay 
and Hendershott (2003) show a high level of correlation between trading volume and 
volatility during early NASDAQ trading. They show similar trading volume patterns to the 
ones we show in this paper. The highest trading volume is recorded for the first half-hour 
trading interval at the open, and volatility, measured as the standard deviation of half-hour 
stock return, also attains the highest level for the day during the same half-hour interval. The 
emerging U-shape pattern seen developing during the continuous trading period in Figure 1 is 
also well-documented in literature (see as an example, Chan et al., 1995). The volatility in 
trading volume around the open and close is also related to widening bid-ask spreads during 
that period as shown in both panels of Figure 4. This intraday behaviour is consistent with the 
pattern that has been extensively reported and discussed in the literature (see as an example, 
Brock and Kleidon, 1992).       
The vast majority of trades during the opening call auction are for the highest volume 
stocks. Although, with the exception of the minute ending 16:35:00hrs when the closing 
auction algorithm usually runs, 08:00:00hrs has the highest trading value, the number of 
trades for the minute is very small in comparison to the rest of the trading day minutes. 
Microstructure literature suggests that large trades are more informative than smaller-sized 
ones, thus we expect that trades at 08:00hrs, and during other minutes of the entire pre-open, 
 will be more informative than trades at any point during the NTH or post-NTH. We test this 
hypothesis in Section 4.2.2.
8
  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The average trading value following the opening call auction is sustained at over £170 
million only on account of a steep increase in the value of lower volume stocks traded within 
the first 10 minutes of the NTH following their failure at the opening call auction. The lower 
volume stocks seem to have settled for a de-facto price referencing period between 08:00:00 - 
08:10:00hrs because the trading value for Quintiles 4 to 1 then rise relative to the Quintile 5 
levels during this period. To underscore this evolution, the trading value of the four lower 
quintiles combined approaches 45.14% of Quintile 5 trading value for the period. This is the 
highest level relative to Quintile 5 stocks, which the combined lower quintile stocks attain at 
any point during a typical trading day.
9
 Afterwards, and for the rest of the day, the trading 
value settles down to a relatively stationary value, starting at approximately £2.87 million for 
the minute ending 08:11hrs, throughout the trading day, and prior to the closing call auction.  
Although there are far fewer trades per minute in both the pre-open and post-NTH 
than there are in the NTH, their sizes are larger. In Figures 2 and 3, we show the mean and 
median trade sizes per minute for each quintile.  Due to the large differences between the 
trade sizes in the three periods, we plot the logarithmic values of the mean and median rather 
than the raw values. With the exception of Quintile 5, the mean trade sizes are stationary once 
the market opens. The median values however are better behaved, with all the quintiles in 
                                                          
8
 The spikes seen in Figure 1 (as well as in Figure 2) are as a result of volumes of dealer (upstairs) trades from 
institutional traders. Their executions are as a result of tapping into unexpressed liquidity and thus do not result 
in any unusual price movements. These trades based on unexpressed liquidity seldom contribute significantly to 
price shifts since the upstairs market exists mainly to ensure that such does not occur (see Grossman, 1992; 
Seppi, 1990; Smith et al., 2001). 
9
 Ellul et al. (2005) already report on the case of failure to open at the call. Their analysis shows that the call is 
not optimal for medium and small cap stocks. In this paper, we provide microstructure evidence that suggests 
this is a function of trading activity rather than market capitalisation. Further evidence provided in successive 
sections will explore this phenomenon further and provide more insight. 
 sync.  This is because the median is less affected by extreme trade sizes executed off the floor 
through the broker-dealer channels. However, both measures tell the same story. 08:01:00hrs 
has the highest mean trade size for the entire NTH at £157,872.44, however this is only 
0.85% (0.87%) of the average trade size at 07:16:00hrs (16:34:00hrs). These comparisons 
evidence the extent of variability in trade sizes during the different trading periods. With such 
large variations, we also expect dramatic variations in the identity of dominant market 
participants during the different trading periods. Specifically, we anticipate that more 
informed trades are being executed around the open and the close. We test this hypothesis in 
Section 4.3. 
INSERT FIGURES 2, 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Price Discovery on the London Stock Exchange 
In the preceding section, we show the periodicity of trading activity, such that there is a high 
level of volatility around the open, and a generally high but stable level of trading activity for 
most of the trading day. We also observe how the average size of trades expand as the trading 
day draws to a close, and attains new levels during the period around the closing call auction. 
These competing effects, according to the literature (see for example Barclay et al., 1990; 
Chordia et al., 2011) determine the amount and timing of price discovery over daily trading 
cycles. Since our main interest in this paper is to examine the efficiency of the impounding of 
information in the prices of stocks around the open and close, i.e. the informational efficiency 
of price discovery, it is pertinent to commence our analysis by examining the intraday price 
discovery process across the entire trading day.   
  
4.1.1. Weighted Price Contribution 
 We estimate the proportion of close-to-close price evolution discovered for different periods 
across the day, starting with the first period when off floor trades are sent to SETS between 
07:10:00 and 07:20:00hrs. The periods for which we estimate the proportion of close-to-close 
price discovery include the first 10 and the final five 10-minute periods across the trading 
periods, as well as the block of trading hours between 09:00:00 - 16:00:00hrs. Since we 
measure period by period price discovery, we use the well-established weighted price 
contribution (WPC) (see Barclay and Hendershott, 2004; Barclay et al., 1990; Barclay and 
Warner, 1993; Cao et al., 2000; van Bommel, 2011).
10
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rets corresponds to the close-to-close return for stock s and skret , is the logarithmic return for 
period k and for stock s. In Equation (1), 
s
sk
ret
ret ,  is a measure of relative proportion of the day’s 
return given by stock s; 
 
S
s s
s
ret
ret
1
, which is the standardised absolute value of sret , which is 
the weighing factor for each stock. With the introduction of a weighing factor, smaller sret  
are thus given small weights. The WPC is normally computed on a stock-by-stock basis and 
then averaged out across the stocks (see Cao et al., 2000). For this procedure, however, stock 
correlations, due to the common constituents, complicate statistical inferences about the 
mean. In our sample, we compute the WPC for each stock and obtain the average cross-
sectionally across stocks and also compute WPCs for each day and the average across days; 
however, similarly to Barclay and Hendershott (2003), we only notice slight qualitative 
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 van Bommel (2011) show that the WPC is consistent; it is also the only unbiased and asymptotically normal 
measure for price discovery if the price process follows is a driftless martingale. 
 differences. Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), we obtain the mean WPC for each day, 
and employ the time series standard error of the daily WPCs for statistical inference. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 presents the WPCs for five quintiles and all the stocks combined; the results for each 
category of stocks are for 10-minute periods from 07:10:01 - 09:00:00hrs and 16:00:01-
16:50:00hrs, as well as for the NTH period between 09:00:01 and 16:00:00hrs. There are four 
striking results emerging from this analysis. The first is the huge disparity in the proportion of 
price discovery recorded during the opening call auction period for Quintile 5
11
 stocks on one 
hand, and the lower quintile stocks on the other. So striking is the difference that none of the 
lower quintile stock WPCs during the opening call auction are significantly different from 
zero. This clearly illustrates the general lack of informativeness of dealer transactions 
favoured by the lower quintile stocks during the call auction period. It further suggests that 
platform/floor orders/trades are still primarily the drivers of opening price change on the 
LSE; this much is underscored by the general lack of statistical significance for the pre-call 
period WPCs as well.
12
 The results here are therefore consistent with the literature on the 
price impact of upstairs (dealer) trades (see Grossman, 1992; Smith et al., 2001). Second, 
approximately 30% or more of the close-to-close price discovery occurs during the call 
auction (08:00:00 - 08:10:00hrs) period for Quintile 5 (other quintiles) stocks. This shows 
that information accumulated overnight is incorporated into stock prices during the call 
auction for high volume stocks and within the first few minutes of the NTH for other stocks. 
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 There are a few Quintile 5 stocks (e.g. BAES, BLT and RIO) that suffer failure at the open call auction or post 
no trades/auction orders during the call auction; they are excluded from aggregate WPC of Quintile 5 stocks as 
well as further analyses of the 10-minute opening call auction period in order to ensure comparability of 
samples.    
12
 The statistical significance and value of these estimates are at variance with those obtained by Ellul et al. 
(2005). While we do not postulate as to the reasons why, we expect that this difference is related to the fact that 
our sample is more recent by more than 13 years than Ellul et al.’s (2005) and the market has evolved over time. 
However, we note that our results are more in line with the observation of Friederich and Payne (2007) that the 
opening auction on the LSE hardly succeeds; their data is slightly more recent than Ellul et al.’s (2005). 
 It is tenable to expect that firm-relevant information is accumulated overnight since firms 
routinely time the releasing of their earnings and other reports for the post-NTH; these 
releases have also been shown to impact trading during after hours trading sessions (see for 
example Jiang et al., 2012). Further, price innovation in the early trading could have been 
influenced by broker-dealer activity. Thus for stocks that are not extensively traded/reported 
post-NTH, the first opportunity to incorporate new information will be during the first 
minutes of NTH or the pre-open. The puzzling aspect however is that the early broker-dealer 
trades do not reflect all of the overnight information, even if they are largely liquidity-driven 
as suggested by the upstairs trading literature (see Smith et al., 2001). Indeed price discovery 
does not really commence until the call auction period at 07:50:00hrs for all stocks; even then 
it only starts for the highest volume stocks and not the lower volume ones. For the lower 
volume stocks, price discovery only starts when the market opens at 08:00:01 hrs. This leads 
to the third striking aspect of the results. More than 50% of price discovery occurs before 
09:00:01hrs in the morning for the lower quintile stocks. And if one considers the call auction 
period as well, then the same phenomenon is true for the highest volume quintile. Thus 
information is only normally incorporated into stock prices in small drips after the heavy 
absorption of information into stock prices in the morning. Finally, the fourth main 
observation from Table 2 involves the dramatic correction of prices recorded once the market 
closes. It does appear that the closing auction and the broker-dealer trades after the 
continuous trading session/NTH provide the opportunity for traders to revise downwards 
their valuation of stocks, especially for the higher volume quintile stocks. 
The results obtained here are consistent with the conclusions from after hours trading 
analysis of NASDAQ stocks by Barclay and Hendershott (2003). Since the high volume 
stocks have a greater percentage, compared with other stocks, of their total daily trading in 
the pre-open (see Table 1), a large proportion of price discovery thus shifts to the pre-open, 
 specifically to the opening call auction period. Thus, the question of why there is a high level 
of failure to open at the opening call for lower volume stocks is not only related to traders 
making a decision based on transaction costs; it may also be explained by the simple question 
of non-execution of trades. With lower trading volumes (including broker-dealer trades), such 
as a daily stock level average of 0.54 trades in the pre-open per day for Quintile 1 stocks, 
finding counterparty to trade with must be challenging; Ellul et al. (2005) make this argument 
by proposing the coordination theory as an explanation of low volume stocks traders’ 
behaviour, by avoiding the call auction.  However, it is perhaps possible to encourage low 
volume stock traders to use the opening call auction if a slight adjustment could be made to 
the call auction algorithm. At present, the algorithm is tailored to maximise volumes; it could 
perhaps prioritise price. For example, a volume weighted price during the call auction will 
ensure that low volume stock trades stand a better probability of execution. Low volume 
stock traders could then place market orders with a higher expectation of execution.     
 
 
 
 
   
4.2. Price Discovery and Informational Efficiency 
4.2.1. Unbiasedness Regressions 
The WPCs indicate that approximately 30% or more of the close-to-close price discovery 
occurs during the call auction for Quintile 5 stocks and during the 08:00:00 - 08:10:00hrs 
period for other quintiles stocks. It is assumed that these respective periods set the pace for 
price discovery throughout the NTH and beyond, since they are the most informative 
intervals during the entire trading periods. Trades around the open and indeed the close are 
 large. However, the spreads around those periods are large as well (see Figure 4). This 
implies price reversals around those periods as indicated by the negative WPC estimates 
around the close. The combination of potential price reversals and the sparse trading activity 
in the pre-open means that prices are likely to be noisy and thus inefficient. Considering the 
importance of the opening and closing prices to trading and investor confidence, we measure 
their informational efficiency by employing what Biais et al. (1999) call ‘unbiasedness 
regressions’. The slopes of these regressions have a natural interpretation as the degree of 
noise during an estimated period. We examine efficiency of the price discovery process due 
to the significance of the opening price for investors. This is vital when one considers that a 
market’s informational efficiency is a critical requirement for investor participation in 
markets. In order to compute the level of price efficiency for specified periods, for each stock 
and each day, Equation (2) is estimated separately for each time period; where ccret  is the 
close-to-close return and ckret  is the return from the close to the end time of period k:  
ckckcc retret                                                                                                              (2) 
According to Barclay and Hendershott (2003), the slope coefficient β measures the ratio of 
signal to the noise. Consider the standard errors-in-variables problem a la regression analysis; 
if we assume no errors in the stock returns computation as well as no correlations, the slope 
coefficient in (2) will be equal to one. Further, we assume that the actual return is not 
observable since the observable return is a combination of the real return plus some noise 
element. Noise may include microstructure effects such as spread components or reversible 
price impacts. Thus we will observe vRETret cccc    and uRETret ckck   and assume that 
ccRET  and ckRET  are the actual returns, and v and u have zero mean and respective variances 
equivalent to 
2
v  and
2
u . An ordinary least squares estimation of Equation (2) will yield an 
estimated slope coefficient *, where  
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ckRET
2  captures the total observable information from the previous close to the time period 
k and  is the noise effect in prices at period k. The slope is thus a measure of the ratio of 
information content (signal) to signal plus noise in prices at period k. Therefore, the extent to 
which the slope is less than unity is the extent of noisiness in period k, since if there is no 
noise element the slope will yield one. Equation (2) is estimated for each stock and each 
period k. From these regressions, we obtain the slope coefficient estimates for each stock and 
in turn compute the mean stock slope for each time period. We also follow Biais et al. (1999) 
to compute the confidence bands by using the time series’ standard errors of the mean of the 
slope coefficient estimates. The mean coefficient and estimates, along with the confidence 
bands, are charted in Figures 5a - 5e. As pointed out by Biais et al. (1999), the time series 
estimation of stock returns in the presence of learning is problematic as a result of non-
stationarity, which can be induced by non-stationarity. In order to avoid the spurious 
regression problem, we examine each time series for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test; and the obtained results suggest that the variables are stationary. We also ensure 
that we obtain robust standard errors by applying the Newey and West (1987) 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance (HAC) matrix estimator, which 
is consistent in the presence of both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. 
The results obtained from the HAC estimation are not materially different from those 
obtained for the regressions using only OLS.  
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The charts for the mean coefficients are presented individually for each pound volume 
quintile. The charts for the lower volume quintiles are quite consistent; however, as expected, 

 u
2
 Quintile 5’s chart looks slightly different. For the highest volume stocks (Quintile 5), the 
informational efficiency of stock prices is low prior to the call auction period when only 
broker-dealer trades are submitted. During the call auction interval, a dramatic rise in the 
mean coefficients is registered; the mean estimate increases nearly five times to 0.83 from 
0.17 during the 10-minute interval ending 08:00:00hrs. 10 minutes later, at 08:10:00hrs, the 
mean coefficient has risen to 0.97; this level of price efficiency is thereafter largely 
maintained until about 09:00:00hrs. The informational efficiency of the stock prices remains 
high, above 0.84, for the rest of the trading day even after the market has closed. The 
evolution of the price discovery efficiency as shown in Figure 5 does suggest that the call 
auction price discovery is informationally efficient for the highest volume stocks. However, 
for lower volume stocks, which experience failure to open at the call auction, the mean 
coefficients at 08:00hrs are very low. The highest at 08:00hrs is for Quintile 2 at 0.23. 
Thereafter, however, once the continuous order-driven trading period gets under way, the 
mean coefficient estimates for all the lower volume stocks rise dramatically, in a fashion 
similar to Quintile 5’s rising, during the call auction. These results are at variance with 
Barclay and Hendershott (2003) who report high informational efficiency in the pre-open for 
all stocks in their sample, although they fail to make distinctions on the basis of trading 
activity. Our results are however similar to Biais et al.’s (1999) findings. We put this 
disparity in results down to trading activity. Biais et al.’s (1999) results are based on an 
analysis of a market, the Paris Bourse, where no actual trading occurs during the pre-open, 
while Barclay and Hendershott’s (2003) results are based on a sample of NASDAQ stocks 
traded in the pre-open with a relatively higher number of transactions than in our sample. 
Also in our analysis, we further divide the pre-open into five intervals before conducting our 
analysis, thereby yielding a reduced average number of transactions for each interval. Thus 
the results in this section further cement the prior literature findings that trading activity is a 
 critical part of the price discovery process and its efficiency. The opening and closing call 
auctions are both informationally efficient for the highest volume stocks because of their 
adequately high level of trading activity. As shown in Table 1, the lower volume stocks also 
have appreciable levels of trading activities in the post-NTH, therefore their informational 
efficiency is largely sustained even after the market has closed, and the transaction numbers 
have dropped sharply. We therefore propose that if measures are introduced to increase the 
trading activity in the opening call for lower volume stocks, the pricing efficiency of stocks 
during the call auction will increase and more price discovery will shift to the opening call. 
          
4.2.2. Weighted Price Contribution per Trade (WPCT) 
The high level of price efficiency recorded for the opening call auction (10-minute period 
ending 08:10:00hrs) for Quintile 5 stocks (other quintiles) and the high WPCs for those 
periods, when considered along with the relatively low number of transactions, suggest that 
individual trades reveal more information for all stocks in the pre-open than during the NTH. 
Lower volume stocks trades during the first 10 minutes of the NTH are also expected to 
reveal more information than the rest of the NTH. We examine this by constructing the 
weighted price contribution per trade (WPCT), which measures the amount of price return 
observed for each of those intervals. The WPCT is computed by dividing the WPC per 
trading interval by the weighted ratio of trades executed during that period (interval). If, for 
each day, tk,s is the number of executed trades in time period k for contract s, and ts  is the 
total sum of tk,s  for all the periods, then WPCTk is defined as: 
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Since the WPCT refers to the ratio of the aggregate price shift occurring in a period scaled by 
the ratio of trades in that same period, the measure should equal approximately one if all the 
trades contain similar information levels. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 reports the results for the WPCT analysis. As hypothesised, trades in the pre-open are 
very informative and are all significantly different from zero. Given that most of the price 
discovery per minute occurs between 08:00and 08:10hrs for the lower quintile stocks, 
WPCTs are also high and significantly different from zero for that period and for those 
stocks. Generally the WPCTs are very high, and somewhat noisy given the low trading 
levels, prior to the open. Thereafter they decline as the NTH commences. This shows that the 
informativeness of individual transactions has dwindled, and that during the NTH one trade 
hardly moves prices in a significant manner; i.e. price movements are likely to occur on 
account of order flow rather than just a trade (see for example Chordia et al., 2008). The 
results in this section are further confirmation that the market is more efficient during the 
NTH than other trading periods, since it is unlikely that one trade’s information content will 
be large enough to cause a significant shift in price. Also, the trades have become less 
disproportionately informative than they seem to be during the pre-open. Further, the results 
here, considered in tandem with the increasing liquidity evidenced in the spread analysis 
shown in Figures 5a and 5b, suggest that as the market progresses from the opening call 
 auction period towards the NTH the stock prices, especially for large volume stocks, become 
more efficient.   
 
We contend that the improvement in stock price efficiency in the case of Quintile 5 stocks 
during the opening call is a function of the informativeness of the transactions. As the day 
progresses, trades become less informative after the information accumulated at the previous 
day’s close has been incorporated in the early trading, starting with the opening call auction 
for the Quintile 5 stocks. Had the lower quintile stocks been able to muster trading depth 
during the call, their price discovery would have commenced earlier, at the open call auction, 
as well. However, given a fear of lack of counterparty to fill orders, many lower volume 
stock traders opt to either hold off trading until the floor opens at 08:00:00hrs, or trade 
through the broker-dealer route. Trading activity evidence suggests that the majority of this 
class of traders do the former. Thus, based on the data in our sample, lower volume stock 
traders are not really choosing between the broker-dealer route and the call auction as 
suggested by Ellul et al. (2005). Rather they are largely withholding trades until the market 
opens, where they are more likely to have their orders filled, or perhaps to avoid trading in an 
environment dominated by informed traders. Since lower volume stock traders are likely to 
be largely uninformed or noise traders, they will normally avoid trading with informed 
traders or seek a premium for doing so. This view is underscored by recent theoretical 
evidence presented by Malinova and Park (2014). They show that in a dynamic market where 
several heterogeneously informed traders choose to place orders, better informed traders trade 
immediately, while worse informed traders delay even when they know that the market could 
move against them. We therefore suggest that small volume stock traders avoid trading 
during the call auction because of the dominant presence of informed traders, thereby leading 
to the failure of lower volume stocks at the opening call auction. In Section 4.3, we examine 
 the evolution of informed trading/information asymmetry across the different trading periods. 
If the opening call period has higher adverse selection costs than other trading periods, this 
will support our hypothesis. Based on the evolution of the spread estimates in Figure 4, we 
expect a higher level of informed trading during the opening call auction period. The pre-
open and post-NTH spreads are generally wider than the NTH. Even more surprising is the 
sustained widening of spreads during the opening call auction period for mainly the highest 
volume stocks. For example, the bid-ask (effective) spread increases more than 43 (17) times 
at the opening call auction start (07:51:00hrs) from the previous minute. This unexpected 
evolution however resonates with the relative and uneven informativeness of the high volume 
stock trades during the entire pre-open period. Curiously, the relative informativeness of the 
opening call auction trades help in raising the level of price efficiency despite their widening 
of the spreads because they are information-driven trades.  Thus the new prices they reveal 
are unlikely to be reversed in the short term. The spreads are therefore wider during the 
opening call auction period because market makers recognise the impact of the auction 
transactions and respond accordingly. The informativeness of the transactions is evidenced 
further by the rapid improvement in price efficiency starting at 07:51:00hrs. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE     
4.3. Modelling Adverse Selection Costs 
4.3.1. Adverse Selection Costs by Trading Pressure 
We now return to the question of the type of traders dominating trades at specific intervals 
during the trading day. Early microstructure models identify two main types of traders: the 
liquidity trader, who trade in order to maintain an optimal portfolio, and the informed trader, 
whose aim is to profit from private information. Low volume stock traders are likely to avoid 
trading in an environment dominated by informed traders, because they are uninformed 
 themselves and are thus largely liquidity traders. Given the evolution of the various spread 
measures obtained across the day (see Figure 4), there is sufficient reason to expect that the 
relative composition of traders evolves quite significantly from period to period. Since the 
spreads are higher in the pre-open and post-NTH, we expect the trades during those periods 
to be of the informed variety. As trading periods dominated by informed traders are 
characterised by higher adverse selection costs, the spreads widen to accommodate increasing 
market makers’ adverse selection costs in addition to other costs captured by the spread – 
stationary inventory and transaction costs. 
We estimate the adverse selection costs using the Huang and Stoll (1997) spread 
decomposition model; we expect this to give us an indication of the type of traders 
dominating different points across the trading day. This approach employs the fact that quote 
shifts due to inventory costs do not arise from inventory alterations in just one stock, i.e. the 
instrument of interest, but from other stocks held in a given portfolio of stocks.
13
 This is thus 
a portfolio approach to decomposing the spread, it is based on the assumption that adverse 
information relates to instruments on an individual basis, yet inventory impacts are portfolio 
wide. In employing this approach, we assume, similarly to Heflin and Shaw (2000), that 
‘liquidity suppliers’/market makers take the opposite of all executed trades or submitted call 
auction orders, which are then executed when the call algorithm runs. Liquidity providers 
may not be interpreted strictly as market makers, but also as other traders watching more than 
just one stock at a time. This is tenable since liquidity may be defined as the availability of 
counterparties to trade with. Indeed Huang and Stoll (1997) propose a refinement of their 
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 Consider a liquidity supplier purchasing stock x at the bid quote. The trade will lower the bid and offer prices 
of the stock as well as for other correlated stocks. The opposite of this trade is a sale in the correlated stocks; this 
hedges his position in stock x. In reverse, if we assume that the other stocks are constrained by trading pressure, 
the liquidity supplier may choose not to induce lowering of the quoted prices for x if his aim is to hedge his 
buying of other stocks thus spurring sales in x. This approach recognises that there is a probability that x’s 
quotes are driven by more than just inventory impacts and the information components of only x. Specifically, 
trading pressure on account of other stocks should result in alterations in quotes of x due to the efforts of 
liquidity suppliers to retain the balance of their portfolios. 
 approach through the nomination of specific portfolios other than purely a market maker’s. 
An example of such a portfolio is an index portfolio such as the FTSE 100, which we employ 
in this paper. 
The Huang and Stoll (1997) spread decomposition model
14
 is given as:  
,1,,31,,2,,1, ttAktkktkktk eQQQP   ,                                                                           (5) 
where  is the change in price from the previous retained trade,  is equal to 1 (-1) 
when the transaction at period t for stock k is a market maker sell (buy) and  is the 
aggregate buy-sell indicator variable used to encapsulate portfolio trading pressure on market 
makers’ inventory levels, defined for a portfolio of n stocks as:  
,                                                                                                (6) 
As the original datasets do not include information on trade direction, we employ Lee and 
Ready’s (1991) algorithm to determine the direction of trade. Specifically, we classify trades 
at a price above the prevailing quote midpoint as market maker sells, and those at a price 
lower than the prevailing quote midpoint as market maker buys. If the current and the 
previous trades are the same price, we classify using the next previous trade. This algorithm 
is established in microstructure literature. Further, independent analysis by Aitken and Frino 
(1996) supports Lee and Ready’s (1991) suggestion that the algorithm’s accuracy exceeds 
90%. The adverse selection spread component, and the half spread, are thus computed by 
estimating Equation (13) using LS as adopted by Heflin and Shaw (2000); the estimate is 
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 This approach is also related to the Ho and Stoll (1983) model that shows the connection between quote 
adjustments in a stock and inventory changes in others. They show that the quote shifts in stock a in reaction to 
a trade in another stock b is dependent on cov(Ra, Rb)/σ
2
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 one-half the estimated effective spread, and the adverse selection component is equivalent to
)(2 ,1,2 kk  .
15
  This approach is established in the literature, (see Heflin and Shaw, 2000; 
Van Ness et al., 2001). Van Ness et al. (2001) even suggest that the Huang and Stoll (1997) 
approach is superior to other commonly used models in measuring adverse selection 
information costs. However, this seeming superiority comes at a cost. The possibility of 
obtaining implausible estimates from the model estimation when using the probability of 
trade reversal approach, rather than the trading pressure approach, has been reported. For 
example, Clarke and Shastri (2000) report this problem in their analysis of 320 NYSE firms; 
Van Ness et al. (2001) also report similar issues. There seems to be a correlation between 
reduced probability of trade reversal and the implausible estimates. This paper reports only 
the trade aggregator estimation, and there is no suggestion that we are faced with this 
problem. Also it is necessary to align the trading times across all stocks involved in the 
estimation. This paper follows an approach described by Huang and Stoll (1997); 
specifically, we employ only the last trade at every five-minute interval when formulating our 
variables.
16
 Huang and Stoll (1997) stated that a cross-sectional estimation of Equation (13) is 
likely to lead to an overestimation of the adverse selection costs. We avoid this potential 
anomaly by adopting time series estimation.
17
 We use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for 
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 Equation (13) can also be estimated using the GMM procedure with appropriate adjustments to the 
orthogonality conditions. The GMM levies relatively weak distributional requirements unlike maximum 
likelihood (see Huang and Stoll, 1997; Madhavan et al., 1997). In addition to following Heflin and Shaw’s 
(2000) estimation approach, we also estimate using the Newey and West (1987) HAC.   
16
 Huang and Stoll (1997) observe that big orders are sometimes broken into smaller trades (see also Barclay 
and Warner, 1993; Chakravarty, 2001). To account for the associated problems arising from this practice, they 
devise a ‘bunching’ technique, such that trades executed at the same price, with same quotes and within five-
minute intervals of one another are bunched into one trade and treated as such. They however conclude that 
using one trade every five minutes greatly reduces any problem that may arise from breaking up large orders. 
Heflin and Shaw (2000) also adopt this approach. Moreover the results obtained by Huang and Stoll (1997) 
utilising the bunching technique suggest that the method unnecessarily increases the adverse selection 
component estimates. 
17
 We also employ panel GMM estimation. Although this method led to the loss of many observations in order 
to ensure synchronity, the overall trend of the evolution of adverse selection costs is consistent with the time 
series averages.   
 obtaining statistical inference on the differences between NTH intervals and the 
corresponding pre-open or post-NTH periods. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Table 4 presents the cross-sectional mean of the adverse selection costs by time period and 
pound volume quintile. The opening call auction adverse selection costs for lower volume 
stocks could not be obtained because of the very low number of trades over the sample 
period. Given that we could not robustly estimate their values with our chosen model, we 
report adverse selection costs for only the highest volume stocks. The available results 
however support our hypothesis that the opening call auction period for the highest volume 
stocks has a significantly higher level of informed trading than other trading periods across 
the day. The results also show that informed trading is lowest during the NTH, while the pre-
open and post-NTH periods generally have higher levels of informed trading across all 
quintiles. Adverse selection costs are lowest across the trading periods for Quintile 2 stocks; 
the pre-opening auction (closing auction) adverse selection costs is 14 (6) times the value for 
the NTH. Overall, there is higher level of informed trading recorded for the higher volume 
stocks during the pre-open and post-NTH, however during the NTH, the lowest pound 
volume stocks (Quintile 1) post the highest adverse selection costs. For completeness, we 
also estimate daily order imbalance (OIB) measures as in Chordia et al. (2008) for each of the 
trading intervals.
18
 The results obtained show that the opening call auction period is highly 
informative for only the highest trading stocks even when dealer trades are considered. This 
is underscored by the significantly positive values for the period in the case of the highest 
volume stocks. For example, the nominal (pound) OIB is highest for Quintile 5 stocks during 
the opening call auction at 0.292 (0.384) and lowest for Quintile 2 stocks during the NTH at -
                                                          
18
 We thank the referee for suggesting this. For brevity, the full results are not presented in this draft but are 
available on request. 
 0.003 (-0.009). In confirmation of the order flow variation across the day most non-NTH OIB 
values are significantly different from corresponding NTH OIB values. 
With these results, our expectation that the opening auction, and generally the pre-
open, contain higher levels of informed trading is therefore confirmed. Thus our results 
contradict previous submissions from theoretical and experimental studies, which suggest 
that call auctions lead to lower information asymmetry (see for example Madhavan, 1992; 
Schnitzlein, 1996). Given, the significance of the results obtained, we propose that the lack of 
trading for lower volume stocks during the opening call auction is related to the significantly 
higher presence of informed traders during the period. This is further strengthened by the fact 
that for lower volume stocks, more dealer trades are recorded per minute for the 40-minute 
period prior to the opening call auction, than for the call auction period. This suggests that 
unless a more transparent opening call auction market is ensured, even when there is a higher 
level of potential counter parties for lower volume stock traders, they are unlikely to engage 
with the opening call auction.     
5. Conclusion 
The opening and closing prices are important reference points for investors and the general 
public. Opening prices may affect trader sentiment throughout the day, and closing prices 
may be used to settle derivative contracts.  Our results, however, suggest that the opening call 
auction often fails, and, on average, the pre-open incorporates little of the overnight 
information for low volume stocks. This may have repercussions for the value of investor 
portfolios – whether these portfolios are composed of the stock itself or a derivative of the 
stock. Based on the foregoing, we examine whether the opening and closing prices yielded by 
the call auction mechanism on the LSE are informationally efficient. We find very large 
variability in our results with respect to trading volumes, such that higher volume stocks are 
more likely to be traded during the opening call auction than lower volume stocks. In fact 
 lower volume stocks routinely fail at the opening call auction. Results suggest that this is due 
to both the unavailability of trading counterparties, as well as a conscious decision by lower 
volume stock traders to avoid the opening call auction given the domination of the period by 
informed traders. Although Ellul et al. (2005) suggest that lower volume stock traders opt for 
the dealer market during the opening call auction because of lack of trading partners; we find 
very little evidence to support this. Rather, lower volume stock traders generally abstain from 
any form of trading during the 10-minute opening auction period. Thus, the price discovery 
process mainly commences for those stocks after the market opens, with more than 30% of 
the daily close-to-close price discovery occurring within the first 10 minutes of the market 
opening. For the higher volume stocks however, the highest rate of price discovery (31.8% 
over 10 minutes) occurs during the opening call auction period. Given the distribution of 
price discovery across the day, the opening call auction period yields a highly informationally 
efficient opening price for higher volume stocks, while an efficient price is not obtained for 
lower volume stocks until within the opening 10 minutes of the NTH. So inefficient is the 
price yielded during the call auction period for lower volume stocks, that informational 
efficiency is generally higher in the 30 minutes prior to the opening call auction than during 
it.  
The closing price yielded by the closing call auction for all stocks is however better 
behaved and highly informationally efficient. This is because the NTH is a very efficient 
trading period, thus providing a strong price discovery platform for the closing auction and 
the immediate market period afterwards (post-NTH). The results relating to the closing call 
auction are therefore consistent with previous literature (see for example Chelley-Steeley, 
2008). However, having examined the LSE’s microstructure, we find no evidence that the 
closing call auction market quality characteristics impact on the next day’s early trading as 
suggested by Chelley-Steeley (2009). If this were the case, price discovery and its efficiency 
 would be high in the pre-open, especially for low volume stocks. Further, we document an 
interesting phenomenon, which runs contrary to Amihud et al.’s (1990) observation on the 
Milan exchange. We show that the call auction preceded by continuous trading leads to 
enhanced price discovery and efficiency for low volume stock rather than otherwise. 
Generally, the results in this study suggest that the influence of the call auction for 
opening the market might have been exaggerated and oversold to investors by platforms 
eager to please the markets. According to Madhavan (1992), the advantage of a call auction 
comes from two offerings: transparency, because all orders are released to the market as at 
when placed, and higher liquidity, because all orders are in before auction. However, in an 
era where high frequency trading is increasingly pre-eminent, these ‘advantages’ can no 
longer be considered as such because higher volumes of trading are achieved during the 
NTH, and the order book, on the LSE for example, is regularly updated in a fashion that 
allows for comparable transparency as during the call auction. Our results suggest that the 
LSE pre-open does not yield informationally efficient prices for low volume stocks, and that 
only high volume stocks benefit from price discovery efficiency during the opening call 
auction. We however believe that the opening call auction could be made more transparent 
and lower volume stock-friendly if the exchange de-emphasises volume during the opening 
call. The call auction algorithm executes with the aim of maximising volume, and this means 
that trades may not be executed at the best possible prices from an uninformed trader’s point 
of view. We propose that the exchange prioritises prices instead, and aim for executing at a 
volume weighted price during the opening call auction, while moving all unexecuted orders 
on to the order book for trading during the NTH. The call auction algorithm should include 
appropriate circuit breakers. If this does not improve the lower volume stock participation, 
this paper has shown sufficient evidence suggesting that doing away with the opening call 
auction altogether will not diminish the efficiency of the opening reference price.  
  
References        
Aitken, M., Frino, A., 1996. The accuracy of the tick test: Evidence from the Australian stock 
exchange. Journal of Banking & Finance 20, 1715-1729. 
Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H., Murgia, M., 1990. Stock market microstructure and return 
volatility: Evidence from Italy. Journal of Banking & Finance 14, 423-440. 
Barclay, M.J., Hendershott, T., 2003. Price Discovery and Trading After Hours. The Review 
of Financial Studies 16, 1041-1073. 
Barclay, M.J., Hendershott, T., 2004. Liquidity Externalities and Adverse Selection: 
Evidence from Trading after Hours. The Journal of Finance 59, 681-710. 
Barclay, M.J., Hendershott, T., 2008. A comparison of trading and non-trading mechanisms 
for price discovery. Journal of Empirical Finance 15, 839-849. 
Barclay, M.J., Hendershott, T., Jones, C.M., 2008. Order consolidation, price efficiency, and 
extreme liquidity shocks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43, 93-122. 
Barclay, M.J., Litzenberger, R.H., Warner, J.B., 1990. Private Information, Trading Volume, 
and Stock-Return Variances. The Review of Financial Studies 3, 233-253. 
Barclay, M.J., Warner, J.B., 1993. Stealth trading and volatility: Which trades move prices? 
Journal of Financial Economics 34, 281-305. 
Bessembinder, H., Venkataraman, K., 2004. Does an electronic stock exchange need an 
upstairs market? Journal of Financial Economics 73, 3-36. 
Biais, B., Hillion, P., Spatt, C., 1999. Price Discovery and Learning during the Preopening 
Period in the Paris Bourse. The Journal of Political Economy 107, 1218-1248. 
Brock, W.A., Kleidon, A.W., 1992. Periodic market closure and trading volume: A model of 
intraday bids and asks. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 16, 451-489. 
Brooks, R.M., Moulton, J., 2004. The interaction between opening call auctions and ongoing 
trade: Evidence from the NYSE. Review of Financial Economics 13, 341-356. 
Cao, C., Ghysels, E., Hatheway, F., 2000. Price Discovery without Trading: Evidence from 
the Nasdaq Preopening. The Journal of Finance 55, 1339-1365. 
Chakravarty, S., 2001. Stealth-trading: Which traders' trades move stock prices? Journal of 
Financial Economics 61, 289-307. 
Chan, K.C., Christie, W.G., Schultz, P.H., 1995. Market Structure and the Intraday Pattern of 
Bid-Ask Spreads for NASDAQ Securities. The Journal of Business 68, 35-60. 
Chang, R.P., Rhee, S.G., Stone, G.R., Tang, N., 2008. How does the call market method 
affect price efficiency? Evidence from the Singapore Stock Market. Journal of Banking & 
Finance 32, 2205-2219. 
 Chelley-Steeley, P., 2009. Price synchronicity: The closing call auction and the London stock 
market. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 19, 777-791. 
Chelley-Steeley, P.L., 2008. Market quality changes in the London Stock Market. Journal of 
Banking & Finance 32, 2248-2253. 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., Subrahmanyam, A., 2001. Market Liquidity and Trading Activity. The 
Journal of Finance 56, 501-530. 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., Subrahmanyam, A., 2008. Liquidity and market efficiency. Journal of 
Financial Economics 87, 249-268. 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., Subrahmanyam, A., 2011. Recent trends in trading activity and market 
quality. Journal of Financial Economics 101, 243-263. 
Clarke, J., Shastri, K., 2000. On Information Asymmetry Metrics. SSRN eLibrary Working 
Paper 251938. 
Comerton-Forde, C., Ting Lau, S., McInish, T., 2007. Opening and closing behavior 
following the introduction of call auctions in Singapore. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 15, 
18-35. 
Ellul, A., Shin, H.S., Tonks, I., 2005. Opening and Closing the Market: Evidence from the 
London Stock Exchange. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40, 779-801. 
Fama, E.F., MacBeth, J.D., 1973. Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests. The 
Journal of Political Economy 81, 607-636. 
Friederich, S., Payne, R., 2007. Dealer Liquidity in an Auction Market: Evidence from the 
London Stock Exchange. The Economic Journal 117, 1168-1191. 
Grossman, S.J., 1992. The Informational Role of Upstairs and Downstairs Trading. The 
Journal of Business 65, 509-528. 
Heflin, F., Shaw, K.W., 2000. Blockholder Ownership and Market Liquidity. The Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35, 621-633. 
Hendershott, T., Jones, C.M., Menkveld, A.J., 2011. Does Algorithmic Trading Improve 
Liquidity? The Journal of Finance 66, 1-33. 
Ho, T.S.Y., Stoll, H.R., 1983. The Dynamics of Dealer Markets Under Competition. The 
Journal of Finance 38, 1053-1074. 
Huang, R.D., Stoll, H.R., 1997. The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: A General 
Approach. The Review of Financial Studies 10, 995-1034. 
Jiang, C.X., Likitapiwat, T., McInish, T.H., 2012. Information Content of Earnings 
Announcements: Evidence from After-Hours Trading. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 47, 1303-1330. 
Johnson, T.C., 2008. Volume, liquidity, and liquidity risk. Journal of Financial Economics 
87, 388-417. 
 Lee, C.M., Ready, M.J., 1991. Inferring trade direction from intraday data. The Journal of 
Finance 46, 733-746. 
London-Stock-Exchange, 2000a. London Stock Exchange: market enhancements. London 
Stock Exchange Limited, London, pp. 1-27. 
London-Stock-Exchange, 2000b. Stock Exchange Notice: SETS Closing Auctions - 
Additional Price Monitoring Extension. London Stcok Exchange Limited, London, pp. 1-3. 
London-Stock-Exchange, 2001. Stock Exchange Notice: Revised SETS and International 
Order Book Closing Auction Functionality, in: London-Stock-Exchange (Ed.). London Stock 
Exchange Limited, London, p. 1. 
London-Stock-Exchange, 2013. Rules of the London Stock Exchange: Rule Book. London 
Stock Exchange Limited, London, pp. 1-102. 
Madhavan, A., 1992. Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets. The Journal of Finance 47, 
607-641. 
Madhavan, A., Richardson, M., Roomans, M., 1997. Why Do Security Prices Change? A 
Transaction-Level Analysis of NYSE Stocks. The Review of Financial Studies 10, 1035-
1064. 
Malinova, K., Park, A., 2014. The Impact of Competition and Information on Intraday 
Trading. Journal of Banking & Finance forthcoming Online 28th March 2014. 
Newey, W.K., West, K.D., 1987. A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix. Econometrica 55, 703-708. 
Pagano, M.S., Schwartz, R.A., 2003. A closing call's impact on market quality at Euronext 
Paris. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 439-484. 
Schnitzlein, C.R., 1996. Call and Continuous Trading Mechanisms Under Asymmetric 
Information: An Experimental Investigation. The Journal of Finance 51, 613-636. 
Schwartz, R.A., 2001. The call auction alternative, The Electronic Call Auction: Market 
Mechanism and Trading, Building a Better Stock Market. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Boston. 
Seppi, D.J., 1990. Equilibrium Block Trading and Asymmetric Information. The Journal of 
Finance 45, 73-94. 
Smith, B.F., Turnbull, D.A.S., White, R.W., 2001. Upstairs Market for Principal and Agency 
Trades: Analysis of Adverse Information and Price Effects. The Journal of Finance 56, 1723-
1746. 
van Bommel, J., 2011. Measuring Price Discovery: The Variance Ratio, the R
2
 and the 
Weighted Price Contribution. Finance Research Letters 8, 112-119. 
Van Ness, B.F., Van Ness, R.A., Warr, R.S., 2001. How Well Do Adverse Selection 
Components Measure Adverse Selection? Financial Management 30, 77-98. 
  
 Figure 1: Daily Trading Volume per Minute for FTSE 100 Stocks 
The average pound daily volume is computed for each minute and for each quintile. The logs of the quintile values are graphed due to the large variability of trading volumes 
across different trading periods. The time covered is from the first recorded trade at 07:16:00hrs until 16:50:00hrs London trading time over the sample period between 1
st
 
October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013. 
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 Figure 2: Mean Trade Size per Minute across Quintiles 
The mean trade sizes per minute are computed for each quintile. The logs of the mean estimates are graphed due to the large variability of trading volumes across the three 
periods. The time covered is from the first recorded trade at 07:16:00hrs until 16:50:00hrs London trading time over the sample period between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 
September 2013. 
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 Figure 3: Median Trade Size per Minute across Quintiles 
The median trade sizes per minute are computed for each quintile. The logs of the median estimates are graphed due to the large variability of trading volumes across the three 
periods. The time covered is from the first recorded trade at 07:16:00hrs until 16:50:00hrs London trading time over the sample period between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 
September 2013. 
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 Figure 4 Informational Efficiency by Time periods 
The signal:noise ratio is computed for 10 minute intervals by regressing close-to-close return on the return from close to time period, k for FTSE 100 stocks trading between 1
st
 
October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013. For each stock, the following equation is estimated separately for each time interval where 
  
retcc is the close-to-close return and 
  
retck is 
the return from the close to the end time of period k:  
  
retcc = a + bretck +ek 
Mean value of the coefficient estimates are obtained for each quintile in the sample and sub-figures A to E graph the informational efficiency as measured by the signa:noise ratio 
per interval for each of those five quintiles.  Confidence intervals are computed by employing the time series standard errors of the mean of the coefficient estimates. 
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 B: Quintile 4 Stocks 
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 C: Quintile 3 Stocks 
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 D: Quintile 2 Stocks 
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 E: Quintile 1 Stocks (Lowest) 
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 Figure 5: Liquidity by Time Periods for FTSE 100 Stocks 
Liquidity proxies per minute are computed for FTSE 100 Stocks trading between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013. Figure A shows the Quoted Bid-Ask spread, 
measured as the difference between the best ask and the best bid price, while Figure B shows the Effective Spread, measured as twice the absolute value of the difference 
between the best trade price and prevailing midpoint per minute. The logs of the spread estimates are graphed because of the large variability of spreads across the trading 
periods. The time covered is from the first recorded trade at 07:16:00hrs until 16:50:00hrs London trading time over the sample period between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 
September 2013. 
A: Quoted Bid-Ask Spread 
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics for FTSE 100 Stocks 
The table shows the daily trading activity statistics for 70 FTSE 100 stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange between 1
st
 October 2012 and 
30
th
 September 2013. Panels A and B present summaries for the trades executed directly via the Stock Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS) 
on the exchange floor and the parallel dealer market respectively, while Panel C shows daily averages of the transactions for both venues. In all 
panels, the sample stocks are ranked by pound volume into quintiles. Quintile 5 contains the 14 highest trading stocks by daily pound value, and 
Quintile 1 contains the 14 least traded stocks by daily pound value. The panels are divided into three main time periods for each quintile: Pre-open 
(07:10:00hrs - call end), NTH (08:00:30hrs - 16:30:00hrs) and Post-NTH (16:30:01hrs - 16:50:00hrs). Pre-open is also further divided into Pre-
opening call auction (07:10:00hrs - 07:50:00hrs) and the Opening auction (07:50:01hrs - call end). Post-NTH also includes the Closing auction 
(16:30:01hrs - 16:38:00hrs) and the Post-close (16:38:01hrs -16:50:00hrs). 
Panel A:  Exchange Floor Trades Daily Trading Summary 
Number of Transactions Volume (£'000,000) 
Pound 
Volume 
Quintile 
Pre-Open Normal 
Trading 
Hours 
(NTH) 
(08:00:01-
16:30) 
Post-NTH Pre-Open Normal 
Trading 
Hours 
(NTH) 
(08:00:01-
16:30) 
Post-NTH 
Pre-
Opening 
Auction 
(07:10-
07:50) 
Opening 
Auction 
(07:50:01-
08:00) 
Closing 
Auction 
(16:30:01-
16:38) 
Post-
Closing 
Auction 
(16:38:01-
16:50) 
Pre-
Opening 
Auction 
(07:10-
07:50) 
Opening 
Auction 
(07:50:01-
08:00) 
Closing 
Auction 
(16:30:01-
16:38) 
Post-
Closing 
Auction 
(16:38:01-
16:50) 
Highest 0.00 426.92 98333.12 2623.41 10.84 0.00 171.70 1171.40 17836.59 0.43 
4 0.00 0.00 77227.34 956.01 3.60 0.00 0.00 554.01 183.60 0.18 
3 0.00 0.00 40726.37 786.09 1.56 0.00 0.00 240.61 83.53 0.07 
2 0.00 0.00 28360.21 670.68 1.23 0.00 0.00 136.47 51.94 0.10 
Lowest 0.00 0.00 17390.17 565.62 0.50 0.00 0.00 58.20 24.90 0.01 
Overall 0.00 426.92 262037.20 5601.82 17.72 0.00 171.70 2160.69 18180.57 0.79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel B: Dealer Trades Daily Trading Summary 
Number of Transactions Volume (£'000,000) 
Pound 
Volume 
Quintile 
Pre-Open Normal 
Trading 
Hours 
(NTH) 
(08:00:01-
16:30) 
Post-NTH Pre-Open Normal 
Trading 
Hours 
(NTH) 
(08:00:01-
16:30) 
Post-NTH 
Pre-
Opening 
Auction 
(07:10-
07:50) 
Opening 
Auction 
(07:50:01-
08:00) 
Closing 
Auction 
(16:30:01-
16:38) 
Post-
Closing 
Auction 
(16:38:01-
16:50) 
Pre-
Opening 
Auction 
(07:10-
07:50) 
Opening 
Auction 
(07:50:01-
08:00) 
Closing 
Auction 
(16:30:01-
16:38) 
Post-
Closing 
Auction 
(16:38:01-
16:50) 
Highest 23.45 1.32 7382.11 29.36 64.43 42.85 1.16 552.98 10.13 37.71 
4 18.83 0.90 7115.34 25.01 53.94 32.02 0.19 154.91 6.83 21.09 
3 14.75 0.61 4387.65 17.36 38.10 13.75 0.13 70.48 3.49 9.69 
2 10.89 0.48 2616.66 11.26 31.48 5.38 0.13 37.28 1.44 5.29 
Lowest 7.37 0.23 1008.97 6.86 22.04 2.46 0.02 14.99 0.84 2.49 
Overall 75.300 3.542 22510.719 89.846 210.000 96.452 1.627 830.642 22.722 76.265 
 
Panel C: Average Pound Trade Sizes 
 
Floor Trades Mean ('000) 
Pound 
Volume 
Quintile 
Pre-Open Normal 
Trading 
Hours 
(NTH) 
(08:00:01-
16:30) 
Post-NTH Pre-Open Normal 
Trading 
Hours 
(NTH) 
(08:00:01-
16:30) 
Post-NTH 
Pre-
Opening 
Auction 
(07:10-
07:50) 
Opening 
Auction 
(07:50:01-
08:00) 
Closing 
Auction 
(16:30:01-
16:38) 
Post-
Closing 
Auction 
(16:38:01-
16:50) 
Pre-
Opening 
Auction 
(07:10-
07:50) 
Opening 
Auction 
(07:50:01-
08:00) 
Closing 
Auction 
(16:30:01-
16:38) 
Post-
Closing 
Auction 
(16:38:01-
16:50) 
Highest - 402.19 11.91 6799.01 39.27 1826.79 879.89 74.91 344.96 585.21 
4 - - 7.17 192.05 49.44 1700.39 215.52 21.77 272.99 390.87 
3 - - 5.91 106.27 43.70 931.82 208.57 16.06 201.18 254.26 
2 - - 4.81 77.44 81.91 494.02 266.93 14.25 127.81 168.16 
Lowest - - 3.35 44.02 27.34 333.54 65.98 14.86 121.79 112.97 
Overall - 402.19 8.25 3245.48 44.34 1280.90 459.30 36.90 252.90 363.17 
 
 Table 2: Price Discovery by Time Period for FTSE 100 Stocks 
The Weighted Price Contribution (WPC)  is computed by the pound volume quintile for FTSE 100 stocks. For each 
trading session/day and period k, we define the WPC as: 
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rets corresponds to the close-to-close return for stock s and retk,s is the log-return for period k and for stock s. The final 
row shows the fraction of days with their close-to-close return equalling 0. Mean WPCs are obtained for each day and the 
time series standard error of the daily WPCs used for statistical inference. * indicates the WPCs, which are significantly 
different from 0 at 0.01 level.  The data covers the trading period between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013. 
 
Time 
Periods 
  
Pound 
Volume 
Quintile 
Highest 4th 3rd 2nd Lowest Overall 
Pre-
Open/Opening 
Auction 
  07:10 -
07:20 
0.009 0.086 0.041 -0.026 -0.024 0.017 
  07:20 - 
07:30 
0.029 -0.005 0.014 0.096 0.046 0.031 
  07:30 - 
07:40 
0.002 -0.013 0.016 -0.072 -0.005 -0.014 
  07:40 - 
07:50 
0.016 0.017 -0.012 0.006 0.011 0.007 
  07:50 - 
08:00 
0.318* 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.065 
Open-
Close/NTH 
  08:00 - 
08:10 
0.068* 0.286* 0.424* 0.369* 0.369* 0.303* 
  08:10 - 
08:20 
0.056* 0.076* 0.048* 0.069* 0.071* 0.064* 
  08:20 - 
08:30 
0.034* 0.021 0.037* 0.042* 0.033* 0.033* 
  08:30 - 
08:40 
0.054* 0.019 0.033* 0.047* 0.027* 0.036* 
  08:40 - 
08: 50 
0.030* 0.028* 0.031* 0.042* 0.032* 0.033* 
  08:50 - 
09:00 
0.024 0.005 0.029* 0.031* 0.005 0.019* 
  09:00 -
16:00 
0.350* 0.465* 0.406* 0.417* 0.460* 0.420* 
  16:00 - 
16:10 
0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.019 0.003 0.006 
  16:10 - 
16:20 
0.012 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 0.001 
  16:20 - 
16:30 
0.015 0.000 -0.004 -0.01 0.003 0.001 
Closing 
Auction/Post 
Close 
  16:30 - 
16:38 
-0.032* -0.03 -0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.014 
  16:38 - 
16:50 
0.016 0.052 -0.034 -0.031 -0.025 -0.004 
 
Days with zero 
price change 
  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 Table 3: Price Discovery per Trade and by Time Period for FTSE 100 Stocks 
The Weighted Price Contribution per Trade (WPCT)  is computed by the pound volume quintile for FTSE 100 stocks. 
The WPCT is computed by dividing the WPC per trading interval by the weighted ratio of trades executed during that 
period (interval). If for each day, tk,s  
 is the number of executed trades in time period k for contract s, and ts  is the total 
sum of tk,s  for all the periods, then WPCTk is defined as: 
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The final row shows the fraction of days with their close-to-close return equalling 0. Mean WPCs are obtained for each 
day and the time series standard error of the daily WPCs used for statistical inference. * indicates the WPCTs, which are 
significantly different from 0 at 0.01 level. The data covers the trading period between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 
September 2013. 
 
Time 
Periods 
  
Pound 
Volume 
Quintile 
Highest 4th 3rd 2nd Lowest Overall 
Pre-
Open/Opening 
Auction 
  07:10 -
07:20 
99.24* 967.37* 374.12* -196.72* -144.38* 219.92* 
  07:20 - 
07:30 
331.57* -66.32* -104.47* 805.06* 320.11* 257.19* 
  07:30 - 
07:40 
94.24* -634.92* 573.85* -2205.55* -107.76* -456.03* 
  07:40 - 
07:50 
1109.12* 770.30* -532.08* 253.73* 357.23* 391.66* 
  07:50 - 
08:00 
26.74* 318.75* 338.74* -72.33* -36.51* 115.08* 
Open-
Close/NTH 
  08:00 - 
08:10 
1.93 8.56* 12.20* 11.37* 14.17* 9.64* 
  08:10 - 
08:20 
2.36 3.30 2.09 3.23 3.59 2.91 
  08:20 - 
08:30 
1.64 1.09 1.80 2.10 2.06 1.74 
  08:30 - 
08:40 
2.66 0.94 1.58 2.38 1.57 1.83 
  08:40 - 
08: 50 
1.73 1.49 1.64 2.40 2.06 1.86 
  08:50 - 
09:00 
1.40 0.28 1.56 1.75 0.31 1.06 
  09:00 -
16:00 
0.50 0.62 0.54 0.58 0.63 0.58 
  16:00 - 
16:10 
0.17 -0.03 0.19 0.60 0.10 0.21 
  16:10 - 
16:20 
0.37 -0.15 -0.13 -0.02 0.14 0.04 
  16:20 - 
16:30 
0.31 0.00 -0.09 -0.17 0.05 0.02 
Closing 
Auction/Post 
Close 
  16:30 - 
16:38 
-0.58 -2.95 -0.17 0.07 -0.16 -0.76 
  16:38 - 
16:50 
28.05* 84.35* -54.55* -38.36* -21.72* -0.45 
  
Days with ‘0’ 
price change 
  0.02 0.012 0.008 0.00 0.012 0.0104 
 Table 4: Adverse Selection Costs by Period for FTSE 100 Stocks 
The table shows adverse selection costs components for FTSE 100 stocks trading between 1
st
 October 2012 and 30
th
 September 2013. The estimates are computed by estimating 
the following time series model for each stock and time period using ordinary least squares:  
 
where  is the change in price from the previous retained trade,  is equal to 1 (-1) when the transaction at period t for stock k was a market maker sell (buy) and  is 
the aggregate buy-sell indicator used in encapsulating portfolio trading pressure, it equals 1(-1, 0) when the sum of 
  
Qk,t-1 across all FTSE stocks in the sample is positive 
(negative, zero). The adverse selection cost component is given as: 
  
2(b2,k + b1,k ). The lower level quintile observations are very low in number, and thus could not provide robust 
estimates, hence their exclusion from the estimated contents in the table below. The standard deviations of the adverse selection costs estimates are given in parenthesis. 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (tie-adjusted) tests are used to determine whether pre-open or post-NTH values are significantly different from the NTH period. The pre-open or post-
NTH periods that differ from the NTH at 1% level are denoted with *.  
 
Pound Volume 
Quintile 
Pre-Open Normal Trading 
Hours (NTH) 
(08:00:30-16:30) 
Post-NTH 
Pre-Opening Auction 
(07:10-07:50) 
Opening Auction 
(07:50:01-08:00) 
Closing Auction 
(16:30:01-16:38) 
Post-Close 
(16:38:01-16:50) 
Highest 
0.102* 
(0.090) 
0.935* 
(0.456) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.041* 
(0.033) 
0.093* 
(0.060) 
4 
0.069* 
(0.049) - 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.027* 
(0.014) 
0.072* 
(0.031) 
3 
0.016* 
(0.010) 
- 
0.001 
(0.0006) 
0.021* 
(0.013) 
0.039* 
(0.018) 
2 
0.014* 
(0.011) 
- 
0.001 
(0.0007) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.016* 
(0.010) 
Lowest 
0.046* 
(0.013) 
- 
0.005 
(0.002) 
0.023* 
(0.008) 
0.061* 
(0.029) 
Overall 
0.049* 
(0.033) 
0.935* 
(0.456) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.024* 
(0.011) 
0.056* 
(0.027) 

Pk ,t

Qk,t

QA ,t 1
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List of stocks used in this study 
ISIN RIC Constituent name 
Index 
Weight 
(%) 
Country 
ICB 
Supersector 
Code 
GB00B02J6398 ADM.L Admiral Group 0.14 UK 8500 
GB0000282623 AMEC.L Amec 0.19 UK 0500 
GB00B1XZS820 AAL.L Anglo American 1.19 UK 1700 
GB0000456144 ANTO.L Antofagasta 0.17 UK 1700 
GB0000595859 ARM.L ARM Holdings 0.83 UK 9500 
GB0006731235 ABF.L 
Associated British 
Foods 0.39 UK 3500 
GB0009895292 AZN.L AstraZeneca 2.41 UK 4500 
GB0002162385 AV.L Aviva 0.70 UK 8500 
GB0009697037 BAB.L 
Babcock 
International Group 0.26 UK 2700 
GB0002634946 BAES.L BAE Systems 0.88 UK 2700 
GB0031348658 BARC.L Barclays 2.56 UK 8300 
GB0008762899 BG.L BG Group 2.41 UK 0500 
GB0000566504 BLT.L BHP Billiton 2.31 UK 1700 
GB0007980591 BP.L BP 4.89 UK 0500 
GB0002875804 BATS.L 
British American 
Tobacco 3.77 UK 3700 
GB0001367019 BLND.L British Land Co 0.35 UK 8600 
GB0001411924 BSY.L 
British Sky 
Broadcasting Group 0.51 UK 5500 
GB0030913577 BT.L BT Group 1.62 UK 6500 
GB00B23K0M20 CPI.L Capita 0.39 UK 2700 
GB00B033F229 CNA.L Centrica 1.14 UK 7500 
GB0005331532 CPG.L Compass Group 0.93 UK 5700 
IE0001827041 CRH.I CRH 0.64 UK 2300 
GB0002335270 CRDA.L Croda International 0.21 UK 1300 
GB0002374006 DGE.L Diageo 2.97 UK 3500 
GB00B19NLV48 EXPN.L Experian 0.71 UK 2700 
GB0009252882 GSK.L GlaxoSmithKline 4.60 UK 4500 
JE00B4T3BW64 GLEN.L Glencore Xstrata 1.94 UK 1700 
GB00B1VZ0M25 HRGV.L 
Hargreaves 
Lansdown 0.13 UK 8700 
GB0005405286 HSBA.L HSBC Hldgs 7.48 UK 8300 
GB0004579636 IMI.L IMI 0.28 UK 2700 
GB0004544929 IMT.L 
Imperial Tobacco 
Group 1.34 UK 3700 
 GB00B85KYF37 IHG.L 
InterContinental 
Hotels Group 0.28 UK 5700 
GB0033195214 KGF.L Kingfisher 0.55 UK 5300 
GB0031809436 LAND.L 
Land Securities 
Group 0.43 UK 8600 
GB0005603997 LGEN.L 
Legal & General 
Group 0.69 UK 8500 
GB0008706128 LLOY.L 
Lloyds Banking 
Group 2.13 UK 8300 
GB0031274896 MKS.L 
Marks & Spencer 
Group 0.48 UK 5300 
GB0005758098 MGGT.L Meggitt 0.26 UK 2700 
GB00B8L59D51 MRON.L Melrose Industries 0.23 UK 2700 
GB0006043169 MRW.L 
Morrison (Wm) 
Supermarkets 0.36 UK 5300 
GB00B08SNH34 NG.L National Grid 1.63 UK 7500 
GB0032089863 NXT.L Next 0.47 UK 5300 
GB00B77J0862 OML.L Old Mutual 0.55 UK 8500 
GB0006776081 PSON.L Pearson 0.61 UK 5500 
GB0007099541 PRU.L Prudential 1.76 UK 8500 
GB00B24CGK77 RB.L 
Reckitt Benckiser 
Group 1.75 UK 3700 
GB00B2B0DG97 REL.L Reed Elsevier 0.59 UK 5500 
GG00B62W2327 RSL.L Resolution 0.26 UK 8500 
GB0007188757 RIO.L Rio Tinto 2.26 UK 1700 
GB00B63H8491 RR.L 
Rolls-Royce 
Holdings 1.25 UK 2700 
GB00B7T77214 RBS.L 
Royal Bank Of 
Scotland Group 0.45 UK 8300 
GB00B03MLX29 RDSa.L 
Royal Dutch Shell 
A 4.65 UK 0500 
GB00B03MM408 RDSb.L 
Royal Dutch Shell 
B 3.22 UK 0500 
GB0006616899 RSA.L 
RSA Insurance 
Group 0.27 UK 8500 
GB0004835483 SAB.L SABMiller 1.78 UK 3500 
GB00B8C3BL03 SGE.L Sage Group 0.22 UK 9500 
GB00B019KW72 SBRY.L Sainsbury (J) 0.33 UK 5300 
GB0002405495 SDR.L Schroders 0.17 UK 8700 
GB00B1FH8J72 SVT.L Severn Trent 0.25 UK 7500 
GB0009223206 SN.L Smith & Nephew 0.41 UK 4500 
GB00B1WY2338 SMIN.L Smiths Group 0.33 UK 2700 
GB0007908733 SSE.L SSE 0.85 UK 7500 
GB0004082847 STAN.L Standard Chartered 1.76 UK 8300 
GB00B16KPT44 SL.L Standard Life 0.49 UK 8500 
GB0008847096 TSCO.L Tesco 1.73 UK 5300 
 GB0001500809 TLW.L Tullow Oil 0.56 UK 0500 
GB00B10RZP78 ULVR.L Unilever 1.77 UK 3500 
GB00B39J2M42 UU.L 
United Utilities 
Group 0.28 UK 7500 
GB00B16GWD56 VOD.L Vodafone Group 6.31 UK 6500 
JE00B8N69M54 WOS.L Wolseley 0.52 UK 2700 
    Total weight 91.23     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
